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8.1  Introduction 
Between  1978 and 1982, the world’s balance of payments statistics 
went off balance in ways that received a good deal of  publicity and 
that presented difficulties to analysts who tried  to work with global 
views of economic activity. The problem showed itself most plainly in 
current-account balances, which for all the countries of the world to- 
gether should always add to zero since each transaction receipt of one 
economy is also a transaction payment by another economy. Any non- 
zero balance in  the world current account represents inconsistencies 
among the country statistics included and incomplete coverage for the 
world as a whole. After 1978, the current-account net balance for the 
world changed from a net debit of roughly $10-20  billion, which pre- 
vailed through most of the  1970s, to a net debit of more than $100 
billion by  1982, a level that has been  maintained more or less ever 
since. Starting around  1979, that is, the data began showing a bias 
toward current-account deficits that could be seen as a global system 
error without clues as to specific countries or regions that were the 
locus of such excess deficits. It was a condition that could produce 
policy biases possibly perverse and destabilizing, and it was unsettling 
to anyone concerned with such matters. 
By  1984, the International Monetary Fund (hereafter referred to as 
the Fund) and other public bodies had concluded that the statistical 
problem was serious enough to justify an explicit and visible effort at 
finding causes and remedies for these imbalances. At the end of 1984, 
the Fund formed a working party to carry out the project and give a 
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report to the managing director by the end of 1986 explaining what the 
group could discover by then. The working party included members 
from the Fund’s  Research Department and  Bureau of Statistics and 
also from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and sev- 
eral national statistical offices around the world. The group represented 
a well-structured  set of viewpoints and information on the matter. A 
small professional staff was set up at the Fund for the project headed 
by Samuel Pizer, who had come to the Fund from the Federal Reserve 
Board for the purpose. 
The final report of the  working  party was given to the managing 
director in December 1986.’ As  a member of the technical staff I  am 
summarizing in this paper some of the major findings of the group on 
sources of the discrepancy, particularly in relation to the United States. 
The next section gives the sizes of the imbalances that the working 
party encountered, and the third section summarizes  the principal find- 
ings of the group as to the sources of the problem and the nature of 
remedies  proposed  by  the working party.  The fourth section  gives 
findings in the report about U.S. statistics in their relation to the world 
discrepancies. 
The fifth  and sixth  sections go beyond the scope of  the working 
party’s report, which was limited entirely to statistical  problems  of 
current-account transactions. The fifth section describes briefly prob- 
lems in the world’s capital account statistics that are connected with 
current-account discrepancies. It then combines tentative suggestions 
for capital account revision  with the proposed current-account revi- 
sions to suggest a new view of the world’s balance of payments state- 
ment as a whole.  The sixth  section concludes the paper with  some 
comments on  the effects  that revisions  in  balance  of  payments ac- 
counting would have on national income and product accounting.  These 
comments raise some questions on defining geographic coverage of an 
economy that should be discussed in the ongoing U.N. project of re- 
vising the system of national accounts (SNA). 
8.2  State of the World Balances 
Table 8.1 gives the set of world balances that the working party put 
its attention to. These are world totals published by the Fund in part 
2 of the 1985 edition of its Balance of  Payments Statistics  Yearbook. 
The categories of balance in the table conform to the Fund’s Balance 
of  Payments Munual (International Monetary Fund 1977) in definition, 
and country statistics that are combined into the table have been fitted 
into these categories by the Fund as closely as possible. The note to 
table 8.1 mentions some omissions from the coverage-mainly  Eastern Table 8.1  Selected Balances of World  Current-Account Transactions (in billions of U.S. dollars) 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Trade balance  18.1  20.3  28.2  24.9  -  2.0  9.8  11.0 
Service balance  -24.7  -29.3  -49.2  -80.6  -100.9  -78.7  -96.4 
Shipment  -24.2  -27.4  -32.0  -34.6  -33.8  -31.8  -33.5 
Travel  -.3  -1.9  -  .9  .7  1.5  3.2  4.5 
Reinvested earnings on direct investments  6.7  11.8  11.2  10.4  7.5  9.9  5.8 
Other direct-investment income  -4.6  .I  -7.6  -10.7  -11.3  -11.5  -11.7 
Other investment income  -6.2  -7.3  -11.2  -22.3  -35.9  -32.0  -41.6 
Other official transactions  -4.0  -9.6  -11.4  -18.3  -24.0  -18.2  -20.5 
Other private transactions  9.6  6.4  6.2  .4  -  .4  5.  I  1.8 
Private transfers  4.5  5.9  7.0  5.7  3.8  6.7  3.7 
Current account (excluding official transfers)  -2.1  -3.0  -  14.0  -50.1  -99.1  -62.2  -81.6 
Official transfers  -17.5  -16.3  -20.8  -18.9  -  14.8  -12.9  -  14.2 
Current account (including official transfers)  -  19.7  -  19.4  -  34.7  -69.0  -  113.9  -75.1  -95.8 
Memo: Service balance as a percentage of 
service payments  5.8  5.4  7.1  10.4  12.8  10.9  12.7 
Other transportation  -1.7  -1.3  -3.4  -6.2  -4.4  -3.4  -1.1 
Source: Balance  of Payments Statistics  Yearbook, pt. 2, (IMF 1985). 
Note: Does not  include estimates of certain current transactions of  the Soviet Union and other nonmember countries of 
Eastern Europe as reported in the World Economic Outlook. International organizations do not supply comparable data, 
and some economies are not included in the statistics on certain transactions. 404  Stephen Taylor 
Europe and international organizations-and  estimates for these groups 
are part of  the explanation  of the world  balances that appear in  the 
table. 
Other presentations of world current-account balances are available 
from, for example, the OECD and the Fund’s own Research Depart- 
ment, and these other versions have somewhat different figures for the 
world net balances. They all show about the same explosion in  debit 
balance  after  1978, however,  and the Fund’s  Yearbook  version  has 
many advantages in underlying detail and staff study that made it the 
most useful  form of the problem for the working party to examine. 
The report is hence a commentary on that specific form of world ac- 
counts, as produced by the Fund’s Bureau of Statistics, a point that is 
worth making early here. 
Most of the growth in discrepancy from 1978 to 1982 occurred in ser- 
vices-$75  billion (table 8.1, row 2), of which $36 billion was in the in- 
vestment income components, and the working party was asked to pay 
particular attention to the problems of investment income that had sud- 
denly come to light. “Other” transactions, both official and private, ac- 
counted for another $30 billion of  the $75 billion increase, and shipping 
and other transportation showed a $12 billion growth. The trade balance 
discrepancy has been surprisingly small in relation to the gross totals of 
world trade, and it has shown no particular trend recently that has con- 
tributed to the recent discrepancy rise.2 Hanging over the trade balance, 
though,  are some still-unanswered  questions about  shipping,  other 
transportation, and “other” services that may reflect inconsistent clas- 
sifications with counterparts in trade. If this turns out to be the case, 
corrections will affect the trade balance, and the question may become 
more important than it now is. Unrequited transfers had a sizable debit 
balance over the years in the table, but it did not grow enough to be part 
of the problem of current-balance increase over 1978-83. 
8.3  Adjustments to the Balances 
Table 8.2 summarizes in a comprehensive form the major findings of 
the working party, as presented in the final December 1986 report. It 
gives the amounts of adjustment that the group can propose now to 
improve matters and preliminary estimates of the regional distribution 
of  those adjustments. The table is  entirely  for the year  1983, and, 
moving from top to bottom, it gives regional distributions of each of 
the published  balances, the working party’s adjustments spread re- 
gionally, and the adjusted results at the bottom of  the table. The col- 
umns of the table cover all categories of current account except trade; 
the trade balance was not part of the working party’s assignment and 
is omitted from the table. At the far right is a summary column with a Table 8.2  Allocation of Services and Transfer Discrepancy, by Country Groups, 1983 (in billions of U.S. dollars) 
Income on Investments 
Other Direct-  Non-Direct-  Shipment  Account, 
Reinvested  Investment  Investment  and  Other  Excluding 
Total Current 
Earnings  Income  Income  Total  Transport  Services  Transfers  Merchandise 
Reported data:a 
Industrial countries 
Middle East oil exporters 
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(continued) Table 8.2  (continued) 
Income on Investments 
Other Direct-  Non-Direct-  Shipment  Account, 
Reinvested  Investment  Investment  and  Other  Excluding 
Total Current 
Earnings  Income  Income  Total  Transport  Services  Transfers  Merchandise 
Adjusted data: 
Industrial countries  6.4  9.3  7.3  23.0  -  5.0  19.6  -  30.3  7.3 
Middle East oil exporters  -  .2  -2.3  26.8  24.3  -  5.8  -  37.0  -  16.2  -  34.7 
Major offshore banking 
centers  -  1.8  -  3.9  6.6  .9  3.8  6.4  -.I  11.0 
Other developing 
countries  -4.8  -9.3  -45.2  -  59.3  -  6.7  .9  41.7  -  23.4 
Eastern European 
International organizations  ...  ...  3.1  3.1  ...  -  7.0  7.0  3.1 
countries  ...  ...  -3.7  -3.7  .8  ...  ...  -  2.9 
Unallocated 
Total 
...  ...  - - 
-  .5  -  6.2 
5.9  5.9  -  6.7  ...  ...  12.6  -  - - - 
.8  -5.9  -  6.2  -  17.0  2.2  -26.8 
Note; Details may not add to totals because of rounding. 
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set of adjustments that reduces the 1983 debit balance from $85 billion 
to $27 billion remaining to be explained and eliminated.  Most of the 
adjustments used for 1983 were also worked out for the period from 
1979 to 1984, and results for the other years were similar to those in 
table 8.2 for 1983. 
It is important to point out that not all the $58 billion of adjustments 
in table 8.2 can be attributed to specific countries in ways that can be 
brought into country statistical procedures. There is an “unallocated” 
row  in  the table  that  contains particular debits and credits that are 
known to be missing from the system but for which there is no usable 
evidence on the countries involved.  The regional totals also include 
some adjustments that can be allocated to specific regions but not to 
countries within the regions. The table thus overstates somewhat the 
steps that might be taken right now in statistical procedures to improve 
matters by either the country or the Fund, but there is nevertheless a 
sizable agenda for improvements to work out between the Fund and 
the countries, and the working party has several recommendations on 
proceeding to this next step. 
Reinvested earnings, or reinvested direct-investment income, causes 
statistical trouble in several ways at the world level. Only a few coun- 
tries estimate the item at all, and the important ones are net investor 
countries, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and the Netherlands. The reinvested-earnings discrepancy is, as a re- 
sult, a net credit balance-$10  billion in  1983-rather  than a debit, and 
reducing it only worsens the total  current-account problem.  Never- 
theless, table 8.2 shows almost all the $10 billion removed, using the 
following principal steps. 
1. The United States includes in  this item a revaluation element to 
reflect effects of exchange rate changes on dollar equivalents of over- 
seas balance sheets stated in foreign currencies.  In recent years this 
has been a large, changeable, and conspicuous source of discrepancy 
in  the world current account. For 1983 it was a $7 billion debit, and 
from 1984 to 1985 it changed by more than $12 billion, from an $8 billion 
debit to a $4 billion credit, when the dollar turned around and started 
downward. No other country includes exchange rate effects in its bal- 
ance of  payments, and this U.S.  procedure plainly produces a floater 
that goes directly to the current-account total balance. The working 
party recommends that the U.S. data exclude any such capital gains 
and losses-as  they are excluded from the U.S.  income and product 
accounts-and  that at most they may be included as memo items on 
the U.S.  country page of the Yearbook. 
2. The United States includes in  reinvested income an estimate for 
retained earnings of foreign branches that is also not matched by other 408  Stephen Taylor 
countries,  which  put  branch  earnings  entirely  in  “other”  direct- 
investment income. Part of the table 8.2 adjustments ($3 billion) shifts 
the U.S.  earnings as credits to the second column, improving both 
balances without affecting the current-account total balance. 
3. Finally, geographic information from the four major investor coun- 
tries mentioned  above is used to insert contra entries on reinvested 
earnings into the accounts of partner countries that had reported noth- 
ing or obviously  incomplete amounts for this item. This was a big 
adjustment413 billion of  net  debits for  1983-and  is  plainly  self- 
balancing  since it uses  one country’s  estimates for both  sides of  a 
transaction. At the same time it is an example of improving the system 
by using information for a country that comes from international or 
other-country sources, a practice the working party also uses in other 
adjustments and recommends for wider country consideration in na- 
tional estimates. 
Because of the great void in reporting reinvested earnings that was 
pointed out by the working party, the report strongly recommends that 
this item be omitted from the world tabulations that the Fund publishes 
in part 2 of the Yearbook-until  a good many more countries can be 
persuaded  to send  in data. Omitting the item does not  change the 
balance  in  the  country’s  statement  because  for  each  country  the 
reinvested-earnings  part of current account is automatically matched 
by an equal and opposite item in  direct-investment flows in  capital 
account. There is no actual payment of funds, and omitting both entries 
has no effect on the country’s error and omissions.  Without  better 
reporting, the item is more confusing than helpful in using the world 
data and should be removed for now. 
Other direct-investment income, in the second column of table 8.2, 
has been a more intractable problem than reinvested income, and only 
about half the imbalance could be eliminated for reasons discovered 
in the project. The shift of U.S. branch office reinvested earnings to 
this column that was mentioned above gives a $3 billion credit for 1983, 
and an adjustment for U.S.  treatment  of finance subsidiaries in the 
Netherlands  Antilles adds almost another $3 billion. These Antilles 
subsidiaries had until recently a special tax position that gives U.S. 
borrowers a lower-cost access to Eurobond markets than direct U.S. 
issues in those markets. The practice produced a sizable asymmetry 
in world figures for investment income, however. While countries that 
bought the Antilles Eurobonds reported the bond income as interest 
receipts (if they reported it at all), the payments that were made by 
U.S. borrowers were treated as negative direct-investment income of 
U.S. companies by balance of  payments compilers at the Commerce 
Department. In the middle, the Antilles simply omitted the subsidiaries 
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mismatch between form of payment  and form of receipt within the 
world current account. The working party shifted the U.S. entries to 
the third column of table 8.2, “non-direct-investment income,” to match 
income credits from lender countries. 
The Fund’s version of direct-investment income also includes a Saudi 
Arabia debit of $4  billion that is labeled by the Saudis in their own 
balance of payments as “oil-sector-investment income.” The nature of 
this  $4  billion is  altogether obscure, but it  is much  larger than  the 
corresponding  net receipts of  $1 17 million that are reported  by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, so it appears that 
the $4 billion does not belong in this category, whatever its nature. In 
table 8.2, it is removed in the second column and not reinserted else- 
where in the table, and it is thus an adjustment that carries over to the 
current-account total. 
With some other adjustments that offset those for the United States 
and Saudi Arabia, the working party was not able to eliminate more 
than half the published discrepancy in this direct-investment income 
item. A good deal more needs to be done, and some of the remaining 
problems are already known through bilateral country comparisons that 
show large inconsistencies. To some extent, these inconsistencies come 
from differences in definition of direct-investment relations and in def- 
inition of  foreign and domestic companies. Reconciling these differ- 
ences can take a great deal of time even at the international level, and 
persuading countries to adopt consistent rules in their own work is a 
larger job since the changes that are needed can also affect national 
income and product accounts. 
Non-direct-investment income,  the third column of table 8.2, is the 
category that most conspicuously  went off balance after 1978, rising 
from a net debit of $6 billion in  1978 to one of $36 billion in 1982 and 
$42 billion in 1984 (all these amounts as shown in the 1985 Yearbook). 
On a comparable basis, the 1985 discrepancy was $51 billion. The years 
1979-83 saw a good deal of inflation-10  percent yearly in the Fund’s 
world gross domestic product (GDP) deflator, and a sharp rise in fi- 
nancial claims across borders-a  13 percent yearly growth, and large 
swings in interest rates.  It appeared that  statistical procedures were 
not able to track interest and dividends well enough to cope with the 
new scale of international financial relations. What had been a minor 
defect in balance of payments measurement suddenly became a glaring 
problem and a source of uncertainty. As mentioned earlier, the working 
party was given particular instruction to look at this item, and it was 
a major subject of study by the group and its technical staff. Table 8.2 
shows that as a result of that work the report was able to explain almost 
all the $32 billion net debit for 1983, and the explanations proved to 
be equally effective for the other years of the 1979-84 period. 410  Stephen Taylor 
Two adjustments were straightforward-to  include entries for inter- 
est transactions  by  Eastern  European countries  not  covered  in  the 
Fund’s world figures and for international organizations such as the 
World Bank and the Fund itself that were also omitted from the Fund’s 
totals. These two adjustments roughly offset each other on a net basis, 
however, as table 8.2 shows. (In part 2 of the 1986 Balance ofPayments 
Statistics Yearbook, international institutions are introduced to the world 
totals for the first time, although only for investment income receipts 
and expenses, with the offset in errors and omissions. As a result, the 
imbalance in this item is now considerably smaller than it was in the 
1985 version, but it does not yet reflect the offsetting Eastern Europe 
position.) 
The big adjustments against the $32 billion discrepancy came not 
from better geographic coverage, however, but rather from independent 
tests of the quality of the data already in the system. These tests were 
made separately for income from international holdings of bonds and 
stocks and for income from the various forms of bank positions cross- 
border vis-a-vis other banks, central banks, and nonbanks. A starting 
point for the tests was a detailed questionnaire on investment income 
that the working party sent to about sixty countries asking for national 
information on types of investment income receipts and payments and 
also for whatever stock data the countries had on international financial 
positions.  These questionnaires yielded some significant revisions of 
data in relation to the Fund’s published version, and those revisions 
are included in the table 8.2 adjustments. From the detail in the ques- 
tionnaires, though, specific comparisons could also be made between 
country figures on income and estimates based on independent infor- 
mation outside the country. It was this procedure that yielded most of 
the $32 billion of adjustments in table 8.2. 
For bonds and equities, the results were very approximate because 
useful information on the structure of international security markets is 
scarce and informal. There are no systematic tabulations by official or 
industry groups on the outstanding amounts of  securities held inter- 
nationally that generate the income flows, and the working party had 
to put together estimates of its own, primarily by cumulating gross new 
issues for several years in the form that the OECD publishes in its 
Financial  Statistics publications. There are several steps too detailed 
to go into here in producing appropriate  stock figures, but the final 
result in this exercise was an estimate for cross-border bond holdings 
not involving banks of  $340 billion for the end of  1983  and a corre- 
sponding equity total of  $250  billion. Comparisons of these market- 
based totals with the questionnaire totals of security stocks reported 
by countries implied that about 20  percent of  securities are missing 
from country data as liabilities and that something over 40 percent are 411  World Payments Imbalances and U.S. Statistics 
missing as assets. This finding led to the conclusion that income debits 
and credits are understated  in  the same proportions and should be 
adjusted upward to balance the system. The total adjustment amounts 
to a $9 billion net credit for 1983, almost one-third of the total imbalance 
in this column of table 8.2 for the year. 
There is a problem here in geographic distribution because, although 
the OECD data on gross issues give a clear enough country identifi- 
cation of debtors, we have no statistical basis whatever from market 
data for locating holders of securities. The securities industry believes 
widely that most cross-border securities are held in industrial countries, 
and that belief is used in the adjustments that were made for underre- 
porting of income on securities. This is a case, however, in which the 
report,  in table 8.2, attributes  missing flows to a region-industrial 
countries-but  has no basis for going farther in country identification. 
The other source of independent data that were used to assess the 
investment income discrepancy is the collection of cross-border bank- 
ing information that is compiled by the BIS and the Fund.3 The core 
of these data is a great body of detail reported by banks in about thirty 
industrial countries and offshore financial centers on the geographic 
location of borrowers from and depositors in these banks. The banks 
reporting in the system account for a large part of the world totals of 
international  banking claims that the Fund reports.  As a result, the 
cumulated positions in the tables vis-a-vis a particular country such as 
the United States give a measure of that country’s international banking 
position that is independent of the country’s own statistical system and 
that can be compared with national estimates of the amounts. 
The BIS-Fund data divide the reported bank positions between in- 
terbank claims on the one hand and nonbank borrowings and “depos- 
its” (actually, all forms of claim) on the other. The interbank positions 
from the data are in general closely consistent with national data, with 
the exception of offshore financial centers, which do not always include 
in national totals all the foreign banking business that appears in BIS- 
Fund  figure^.^ Most of the $6 billion adjustment for “major offshore 
banking centers”  entered in the third column of table 8.2 introduces 
the foreign branch earnings to offshore center balance of payments, 
but most of that is also offset in the second-column entry as a direct 
investment debit for those branches vis-a-vis their parents. 
On nonbank positions, however, the BIS-Fund geographic detail that 
appears in “International Banking Statistics” (IBS) indicates strongly 
that country figures tend to understate both claims on foreign banks 
and income from those claims on banks. Although liabilities to foreign 
banks are also understated  in  country  figures, the bias  is generally 
weaker than in assets. The net effect of substituting IBS-based income 
credits  and  debits for country  versions produces  a  total net  credit 412  Stephen Taylor 
adjustment for all countries of over $20 billion for 1983 to be included 
in  the third column of table 8.2. This amount, together with  the $9 
billion net credit adjustment for bonds and equities, accounts for most 
of the total $33 billion adjustment in the table.5 
The nonbank  position  data underlying these bank-derived  adjust- 
ments come, to repeat, from the geographic detail reported by banks 
in about thirty countries that accounted for most of the international 
banking industry at the time. Most, but not all, of the “unallocated” 
adjustment of $5.9  billion in table 8.2 arises from the difference between 
the total of nonbank geographic detail reported and the total of nonbank 
positions  vis-his all banks  of all countries in  the IBS totals.  That 
difference appears as “unallocated”  in IBS tables, and the $5.9 billion 
adjustment is a rough estimate of income not reported on those unal- 
located positions. The unallocated positions have been rising fairly fast 
in IBS, primarily because IBS is expanding its coverage of  financial 
institutions beyond the conventional group of  banks that report geo- 
graphic detail. The positions of these added institutions-for  example, 
thrifts and development banks-must  be put into the unallocated item 
even for industrial countries that have reported to the BIS for many 
years. The unallocated adjustments can be used in explaining the world 
discrepancy, but, plainly, to get better country figures that will reduce 
the discrepancy requires a greater extent of geographic detail in  the 
IBS body of financial institutions. The usefulness of the IBS figures 
even in their present form is a persuasive basis for asking countries to 
widen their reporting scope. 
The growth of the discrepancy in investment income after 1977 raised 
suspicions widely that the discrepancy was related to the growth of 
offshore banking and also perhaps to capital flight from Latin American 
and Asian countries. The Fund gave the working party explicit instruc- 
tion to look into the offshore centers as a source of statistical problems, 
and a section of  the report is concerned with the centers and with 
innovations in financial instruments as a source of the troubles. 
The use of IBS-type data took care of a major portion of this question, 
however,  insofar  as IBS measures  offshore centers adequately and 
insofar as capital flight tends ultimately to take the form of claims on 
banks. IBS coverage of  offshore centers was vital for this purpose.6 
Another important part of the IBS tabulation for this question is the 
special treatment of Swiss data in  the Fund’s version of IBS data: a 
good deal of money (about $100 billion in 1983) is held in trust accounts 
of Swiss banks for owners outside Switzerland and reinvested in de- 
posits in other banking centers, and in IBS tabulations these “other” 
centers report  such deposits as interbank liabilities to Swiss banks. 
Switzerland, meanwhile, omits them entirely from reports it sends to 
the BIS as either assets or liabilities, a practice that results in a dis- 413  World Payments Imbalances and U.S. Statistics 
crepancy of that amount in BIS totals of interbank claims as assets and 
as liabilities. In order to balance the figures and to show a little better 
what is going on, the Fund’s form of IBS adjusts the Swiss numbers 
to include the interbank claims as assets and also to show Swiss bank 
liabilities to foreign nonbanks for the amounts deposited in the trust 
accounts. The Swiss National Bank publishes a geographic distribution 
of the holders of those accounts. 
The geography for offshore centers and for Swiss trust accounts 
seems to go far toward covering capital flight flows that come into 
organized financial markets, and, in the table 8.2 adjustments, nothing 
further is included to reflect capital flight. Several analysts have esti- 
mated capital flight residually for important developing countries, using 
a residual method that is based on cumulations of reported international 
flows for each country  over a run  of  years.  In the procedure, the 
cumulation of capital inflows is treated as a measure of external debt, 
and cumulated current-account deficits and recorded capital outflows 
are viewed as known uses of funds from that debt. The excess of debt 
over deficits and recorded  outflows is treated as unrecorded capital 
outflows, often called  “capital  flight”  (see, e.g.,  Dooley  1986). For 
individual countries, these cumulated residuals have been a good deal 
larger than assets measured by the working party from IBS and security 
market data. However, when the working party tried this procedure 
for all developing countries as a group using twenty-year cumulations, 
the resulting total of private assets was not far from the amounts shown 
in IBS, and most of the difference can be explained. 
The inconsistency here between the results on a country basis and 
the aggregate form has not been explained, and there is more to in- 
vestigate on capital flight measurements. For the working party’s pur- 
poses, though, the larger totals could not be fitted into global statistics 
on financial markets and, more operationally, were not needed to bal- 
ance the investment income accounts. It is possible and perhaps even 
likely that cross-border financial positions are a good deal larger than 
the IBS-based and security market-based  amounts used by the working 
party, through claims that are nominally “resident”  in the country in 
which they are invested and through holding-company and other re- 
lations that never enter statistical systems. The working party was not 
able to look into such possibilities on a basis that produces usable data. 
Instead, the group focused on those procedures that could bring pub- 
lished balance of payments data into consistency with one another and 
with existing statistics on cross-border claims. 
The adjustments in table 8.2 for the last three columns are more 
tentative and sketchy than are those for investment income, which was 
the principal subject for the working party’s program. In shipment and 
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debit but had not changed much over the years from 1978. The report 
concludes that the principal reason for this imbalance is a combination 
of missing shipping revenues and missing port receipts. These two gaps 
arise for separate reasons, but they are both plainly present, and they 
seem to be of about the right size to take care of most of the problem. 
The missing shipping revenues are mainly for three merchant fleets- 
those of the Soviet Union, Greece, and Hong Kong-that  are excluded 
from the Fund’s world totals for various reasons. The gap here seems 
to be related to operators of the fleets rather than registry under flags 
of convenience such as Liberia. Foreign registry of a country’s fleet 
does not appear to cause problems for countries that include shipping 
in their balance of payments figures. None of these conclusions can be 
very firm, though, because the world statistics on shipping that might 
be the outside test of balance of payments figures have no standardized 
concepts of ownership and operator identity that can be related to the 
Fund’s concepts. Shipping statistics  need  much  more development 
before they provide the kind of data base that this problem needs. 
Missing fleet  revenues are matched by missing costs of operating 
those fleets, which should be in transport credits of countries selling 
fuel and services to the fleets.  It is clear from  the Fund’s figures, 
however, that many countries are understating  port receipts by large 
amounts. Table 8.2 includes some tentative and putative adjustments 
for missing fleets and missing port receipts in the fifth column, but they 
are not yet the basis for reshaping country figures that the subject needs. 
The column for other services has only a single adjustment to reflect 
debits by international organizations that belong in the world totals but 
have not been included in Fund publications. This category has a large 
imbalance that is only made larger by the adjustment. Much the largest 
entry in the Fund’s world  table for this  item is an official debit for 
Saudi Arabia-$25  billion for 1983-that  is roughly the size of the world 
imbalance in official services. The content of this item is not known, 
and without explanation no adjustment is possible. The credit entries 
against this Saudi debit may be in other current-account categories, or 
there may in fact be none in this system. 
The transfers adjustments consists mainly of the receipts by inter- 
national organizations of contributions from supporting governments 
that are already  in  transfers debits. With this and some smaller ad- 
justments for specific countries, the world imbalance in transfers can 
be made small. 
8.4  Effects of the Findings on U.S. Statistics 
The United  States is a large economy with long borders and long 
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have been growing, the United States has been running a very large 
discrepancy in  its own balance  of  payments-about  $25  billion  net 
credit annually. One can easily expect that U.S.  statistical problems 
and procedures are in some way related to the world imbalances, and 
the earlier section on direct-investment income mentions explicitly some 
effects of the US.  numbers. When the U.S. components of  the table 
8.2 adjustments are sorted out, however, the total effect of U.S. figures 
is no more than in line with the U.S.  share of world trade and could 
from some viewpoints be judged to be less than that. 
Table  8.3 displays  the main  U.S. components of  the adjustments 
from the “industrial countries” row of  table 8.2. All are in the invest- 
ment income categories, but not all of them affect the total current- 
account balance. Moreover, items 6-8  have an ambiguous position in 
the table because they are amounts that the United States reports that 
Table 8.3  Adjustment Proposed for U.S. Investment Income (1983 flows in 
billions of dollars) 
Direct-investment 
Income  Effect 
Reinvested  Investment  Current 
Earnings  Other  Income  Account 
Other  on 
1.  Remove capital gains 









4.  Shift reinvested branch 
earnings 
5.  Shift Antilles earnings 
First total of adjustments 
6.  Reinvested earnings not 
reported by  other 
country 
7.  Other income not reported 
separately by other 
country 
8.  U.S. transactions with 
nonreporting countries 
Second total of 
adjustments 
7.0  7.0 
7.7 
-  3.7 
4.0  4.0 
- 
2.5 
-2.1  - 
.4  .4 
-3.1  3.1 
2.8  -  2.8  ... 
3.9  5.9  1.6  11.4 
-  7.9  -  7.9 
-  1.8  t .8  ... 
-  1.9  -  1.9 
-4.0  2.2  3.4  1.6 
Source: Final report of working party and unpublished tables underlying the report 416  Stephen Taylor 
are omitted as contraentries by other countries. Those three items are 
included to show the full relation of U.S. reporting to the world bal- 
ances without regard to the source of the inconsistency. 
The first item in  the  table  is the adjustment mentioned  earlier  to 
eliminate U.S. capital gains components that are evidently unique in 
the world figures. This adjustment alone reduces the 1983 world im- 
balance on investment income from $34 to $27 billion, but it is a volatile 
item, and after the dollar exchange rate started downward in  1985 its 
effect on discrepancies had an opposite sign. 
The second item results from replacing Treasury-Commerce data for 
cross-border positions of U.S. nonbanks with foreign banks with the 
corresponding amounts reported by  foreign  banks  in  IBS.  The IBS 
figures are much larger for both assets and liabilities, as table 8.4 shows, 
and the income adjustments in table 8.3 are the differences that result 
from applying  1983 interest  rates to year-average  levels of  the IBS 
positions.’  The revision  in asset and income credit is larger than the 
liability revision, and there is a net contribution of $4 billion to reduce 
the income and current-account discrepancies. The third item is a sim- 
ilar  but  much  smaller  adjustment for portfolio  security  assets and 
liabilities. 
Items 4  and 5 are explicitly mentioned earlier as shifts between cat- 
egories that do not affect the current-account  total, and these plus items 
1-3  reflect the total of the report’s specific recommendations about 
U.S. data. These items remove $1  1 billion, one-third of the world debit 
balance in investment income. Most of that is from the capital gains 
adjustment, however, which changes sign in later years and results in 
very different relations. 
The other items in table 8.3-lines  6-8-are  problems not with U.S. 
reporting  but rather with  the lack of corresponding figures in other 
countries’ reporting in the world tables. About $7.9 billion of U.S. net 
reinvested earnings in  1983 were not reported by the countries listed 
in  U.S.  geographic detail.  If  the  Fund were to accept the working 
party’s recommendation  to remove reinvested earnings, at least tem- 
Table 8.4  U.S. Nonbank Positions with Foreign Banks (1983 year end in 
billions of dollars) 
Assets  Liabilities  Net Assets 
Reported by  United States to working party  52.8  20.6  32.2 
Reported by foreign banks in 1BS  -  167.9  58.0  109.9 
Excess of IBS over U.S. data  12s.  I  37.4  77.7 
on investment income questionnaire 
Nore: 1BS = “International  Banking Statistics” published by the Fund in International 
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porarily, from the standard world tables in part 2 of  the Balance  of 
Payments  Yearbook, the U.S. credit would disappear from world cur- 
rent balances, along with $4  billion of net credits reported by the few 
other countries that show this category. Item 6 in table 8.3 reflects such 
a change, while item 7 shifts across categories to match credits and 
debits, and item 8 reflects the absence of some British colonies in the 
Fund’s world numbers. These changes make U.S. figures more “sym- 
metrical”  with reporting by other countries, and with them the total 
U.S. effect on the discrepancy almost vanishes for 1983. This is not 
the case in later years, however. 
From this work so far, then, the only substantial finding about U.S. 
figures that could affect statistical practices in this country is that U.S. 
claims on foreign banks, net of liabilities to banks, are considerably 
larger than reported by the United States-almost  $80 billion in  1983. 
Although the effect of this on the world current account is plain enough, 
as in table 8.3, it is by no means clear how a shift to that larger number 
would change U.S. national accounts since the effect depends partly 
on whether the income is repatriated. Whatever use is made of  the 
income, the revision would raise U.S. gross national product (GNP), 
personal income, and personal  saving. To the extent that the income 
is left abroad for reinvestment, however, offsets to  the income revision 
appear in increased capital outflows in balance of payments and larger 
financial investments by households in flow-of-funds accounts; there 
is no effect on statistical discrepancies in either balance of payments 
or household-sector statements.*  Only repatriated income would carry 
through to affect those discrepancies. 
No one need actually judge statistically as to the disposition of this 
U.S.  income from foreign  sources, however,  and that is just as well 
since the question is inherently moot. The shift to an IBS-based mea- 
sure of income, rather, would be part of a broader revision that also 
inserts IBS measures of U.S.  nonbank positions into the calculation 
of  U.S.  capital account flows in place of the Treasury data that are 
now used. The effect is a  joint revision for current and capital accounts 
together producing a discrepancy revision that implicitly  “answers” 
the income disposition question. A shift to IBS sources  for U.S. balance 
of payments raises questions for the United States that go well beyond 
the working party’s concern, such as how to deal with the short history 
in IBS nonbank positions and the extent to which IBS figures overlap 
securities data covered by  other Treasury reports. It remains to be 
seen what the full effect of the shift would be. 
For U.S. statistics, the question remains of how it could happen that 
cross-border nonbank  positions  vis-a-vis  banks  could  be  so  much 
larger-$80-$100  billion, net-than  the $32 billion reported by the United 
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the reasonably well-behaved set of international statistics for the United 
States before the problems that began in the late  1970s? We  do not 
know the answer, and there is a wide set of possibilities that ranges 
from underreported current-account balances to capital gains on earlier 
investments abroad. A few simple assumptions can explain a large part 
of  the difference, however, without going far from the published sta- 
tistics, and, although such an explanation has no more validity than 
others, it illustrates what might have happened. 
The procedure consists of no more than applying to the U.S. statistics 
the same capital flight calculations that have been used so often for 
developing countries. We  start from the premise that the current-account 
balance is measured “correctly”-in  a particular sense that hinges on 
the use of the answer-and  take the statistical discrepancy to be a net 
measure of unrecorded capital flows either outward or inward. From 
the 1950s to 1974, the United States tended to have negative discrep- 
ancies that averaged $400 million annually for 1950-59 and $850 million 
annually for 1960-74, except for the infamous 1971, when it was almost 
$10 billion of unrecorded outflow. The simple cumulated sum of these 
discrepancies from 1950 to 1974 is a $26 billion net debit in the U.S. 
accounts. If  we treat these as capital flows, in the limited sense that 
they come out of the recorded transactions as shown, and if we assume 
further that that money is invested and reinvested abroad at roughly 
reasonable interest rates, then the $26 billion easily compounds to a 
total of about $90 billion by the end of 1983, which is not far from the 
$78 billion net excess in table 8.4. The $90 billion result assumes that 
the positive discrepancies after 1974, which cumulate to $145 billion 
from 1975 to 1983, are not a return to the United States of these earlier 
outflows. These later amounts can be some combination of unrecorded 
foreign capital inflows and understated current-account balances, but 
the earlier outflows remain abroad in the calculation and constitute part 
of  U.S. positions in the Fund’s IBS tables. Arithmetic like this is not 
the basis for actually revising any statistics, even when it is ringed by 
considerations of detail that might look realistic. It illustrates only that, 
on this particular question, there can be ways to reconcile the U.S. 
accounts as they exist with international statistics unrelated to U.S. 
sources. 
8.5  The Capital Account Problem 
The last few paragraphs are the first mention in  this paper of  the 
relation of current-account statistical problems to capital account flows. 
If there is a world discrepancy of $100 billion in current-account flows 
in a year, however, then there is also an offsetting $100 billion of other 419  World Payments Imbalances and U.S. Statistics 
discrepancy divided between world net totals of capital account flows 
and errors and omissions. For the one problem there is the other, but 
the Fund’s working party  concentrated  its work and its recommen- 
dations almost entirely on current account, as requested by the Fund 
in establishing the project. Table 8.5 is the principal reference in the 
working party report to the offsets to current account. It shows plainly 
the abrupt expansion after 1976 in both capital account discrepancies 
and the errors and omissions total, with capital account offsetting about 
two-thirds of the growth in current-account imbalances. 
The capital account discrepancy fits well with the investment income 
debit balance in current account: along with understatement of income 
credits, the accounts have an understatement  of  investment capital 
outflows. Finding the categories of  flow that are biased, however, is 
more difficult in capital account than in current because the Fund’s 
standard structure of balance of payments categories is much less suited 
for matching credits and debits in capital account than in current. The 
categories include, for example, separate items for bank and nonbank 
asset and liability flows. However, both bank and nonbank transactions 
are partly with foreign banks and partly with foreign nonbanks, and 
neither category is a consistent set of debits and credits that can add 
to zero across countrie~.~  This is very different from current-account 
Table 8.5  Main Sectors of World Balance of  Payments Accounts (in billions 
of U.S. dollars) 
Cumulated 
1964-76  1977-83  Adjusteda 
Cumulated  Cumulated  1977  -83 
Current accountb 
Capital movements (including 
Of which: Investment incomeb 
reserve transactions)b 
Of  which:  Increase of 
Of which: Increase of  assets 
Of  which: Credit entries 
Of  which: Debit entries 
liabilities 
Errors and omissions 




-  858 
4 
34 
-  30 
- 
-  347 
-  I10 
237 
2,670 
2,433  - 
111 
285 
-  174 
-  407 






-  174 
Source; Unpublished tabulations by the Fund’s Bureau of  Statistics. 
Note:  Negative signs indicate debits. 
aAdjusted to exclude reported reinvested earnings from the investment income account 
because they are recorded asymmetrically and introduce a net credit entry that tends to 
conceal the extent of the actual discrepancy. 
bBalances of  reported transactions, which in principle should be zero for the world as 
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structure, under which,  for example, shipping payments to foreign 
carriers fall  reasonably  into the same category  as shipping  receipts 
from foreign customers. 
Even so, some conclusions about capital account come out of the 
Fund group’s work on investment income, which has a direct link to 
capital account measurement. Tables 8.6 and 8.7 sketch some adjust- 
ments to capital account that illustrate what might be done, and table 
8.8 is then a final statement about the condition of world balance of 
payments measurements, at least for 1983. These three tables were put 
together at the end of the project by Dietrich Hartenstein of the Bun- 
desbank, who was a member of the working party’s technical  staff. 
They are not included in the report to the Fund, but they constitute a 
useful agenda for future work on both current and capital account. 
Table 8.6 is based on the assumption that shortfalls in measuring in- 
vestment income imply similar shortfalls  in measuring capital flows. The 
Table 8.6  Derivation of Nonreported Capital Flows (in billions of 
dollars, 1983) 
Industrial  Other 
Total  Countries  Countriesd 
Actual flows: 
Nonbanks’ bank depositsb  -  49.9  ~  20.1  -  29.8 
Nonbanks’ bank 
borrowingsb  25.5  4.0  21.5 
Security liabilities‘  85  76.5  8.5 
Security assetsC  -  85  -  68  -  17 
Nonreporting in percent:d 
Nonbanks’ bank deposits  ...  60  85 
Nonbanks’ bank 
borrowings  ...  20  20 
Security assets  55  55  55 
Security liabilities  20  20  20 
Nonreporting in U.S. dollars: 
Nonbanks’ bank deposits  -  38 
Nonbanks’ bank 
borrowings  5 
Security assets  -  47 
Security liabilities  17 
12  -  26 
1  4 
37  -  10 
14  3 
alncluding  Undllocated positions but excluding major offshore banking centers. 
hDerived from IBS data. However, now allowance could be made for valuation changes. 
CData  and regional distribution according to chap. 4 of the final report. 
”Percentages according to chap. 4 of the final report, taking into account that reporting 
of new flows (increase of deposits, purchases of bonds) is even worse than reporting on 
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Table 8.7  Adjustments to World Balance of  Payments Accounts with Respect 
to Investment Income (in billions of  dollars, 1983) 
Industrial  Other 
Total  Countries  Countries“ 
Investment income (current account):b 
Reinvested earnings 





Nonbanks’ bank depositsC 
Nonbanks’ bank borrowings‘ 
Securities (net) 
Major offshore banking centers 
Eastern Europe 
Total 





-  38 
5 
-  30 
-5 
-5 






-  12 
1 
-  22 
... 
... 











-  34 
“Including international organizations and Eastern Europe. 
bFor derivation, see chaps. 3 and 4 of the final report. 
‘Including unallocated accounts but excluding major offshore banking centers, Eastern 
Europe, and international organizations. 
same information used for income adjustments in table 8.2 for deposits, 
loans, and portfolio securities is then the basis for estimating missing 
amounts of capital flows in these instruments, at the bottom of table 8.6. 
As mentioned earlier, these adjustments cannot be fitted to specific row 
items in Fund publications, but the totals are there to work with. Table 
8.7 combines those adjustments with others related to investment in- 
come to produce a total identified revision to capital account for 1983 
of $63 billion. The revision in reinvested earnings in current account is 
automatically offset in capital account, and the other changes shown in 
the table are mentioned in the description of table 8.2. 
Table 8.8, then, is the final summary of adjustments that combines 
the current-account changes in table 8.2 (and in the report to the Fund) 
with  Hartenstein’s  estimates for capital account  revisions. The $63 
billion of  capital flow adjustments from table 8.7 virtually eliminates 
the 1983 imbalance in capital account and appears in  “adjustments  1” 
along with current-account changes from table 8.2 (and along with a 
residual $3 billion unidentified in capital account). These changes pro- 
duce a revised set of world accounts, in the center panel of table 8.8, 
that consists only of current-account discrepancies matched in errors 
and omissions for the world totals and with balanced capital flows for 
the two country groups.  “Adjustments  2,”  the next panel, premises 
that at that point the regional capital account balances are correct and 422  Stephen Taylor 
Table 8.8  Overall Results of  World Balance of Payments Adjustments (in 
billions of  dollars, 1983) 
lndustrial  Other 




Errors and omissions 
Adjustments 1: 
Current account (table 8.1) 




Errors and omissions 
Adjustments 2: 
Current account 




Errors and omissions 




-  66 












-  29 
-4 
-  34 
38 
38 
-  38 
34 
-  34 
0 
-  57 
71 
-  14 
44 
-  37d 





-  34 
34 
0 
“Including international organizations and Eastern Europe. 
hBa/ancr of  Payments Statistics Yearbook (IMF 1985). 
CIncluding  changes in official reserves. 
dlncludes $3 billion of  nonidentified capital outflows. 
on that basis states that further corrections of current account, not yet 
known or specified, will eliminate not only remaining imbalances but 
remaining errors and omissions as well. 
The table proceeds from there to a bottom panel that says that cor- 
recting those remaining problems will result in a world statement for 
1983 that consists of a $34 billion current-account surplus for industrial 
countries against the rest of  the world and a matching capital flow to 
the rest of  the world. This is an upward revision in current-account 
balance of $52 billion  for industrial countries and $23 billion for the 
rest of the world relative to  the amounts published in the 1985 Yearbook. 
As mentioned, table 8.8 is a  statement of  work still  to be  done. 
“Adjustments  2”  are both large and unknown, and “Adjustments  1” 
are still lacking a usable identification of countries for some items, even 
as between the United States and other industrial countries. Shipping, 
other services, and transfers can be adjusted only in a sketchy way 423  World Payments Imbalances and U.S. Statistics 
with the information available and need a much closer look than has 
been possible so far. 
The matter now lies, most appropriately, in the hands of the Fund, 
which has received the working party’s report and its recommenda- 
tions. These recommendations range widely, from improving relations 
with country statistical offices to reorganizing the Fund’s Balance of 
Payments Manual, and as  a set they are a reasonably explicit statement 
of work to be done. At the head of the Fund’s agenda, however, should 
be a detailed look by its own staff at the broad quantities of table 8.8 
across countries and across time. There is a good deal of work to be 
done here in  spreading out world balances, testing assumptions, es- 
tablishing a history for the table, and reconciling the flows of the table 
with existing bodies of stock data such as IBS that are separate from 
the flow data. 
All this should be done before discussion of country data problems 
with individual  statistical offices. There is a close interlock between 
current- and capital account data problems for most countries, and the 
two sides need to be worked  out jointly.  At least as important is a 
detailed Fund statement of the condition of the statistics at a world 
level that will show which problems matter most for analysis and policy 
and will be the basis for establishing priorities in the work. 
The Fund has the statistical base, country knowledge, and operating 
incentive to be in a most favored position globally for stating the problem 
and working through it. Up to now, the Fund has published its world 
figures on balance of payments as something of a footnote-part  2-to 
its annual Balance of  Payments Statistics  Yearbook and has taken the 
totals and balances largely as  they come from country reports and staff 
estimates of missing items. The last eight years show that that is no longer 
an adequate procedure. The world figures now need a more specifically 
active role by Fund staff than they have had so far, most specifically with 
procedures for a substantial review of country data that can result in 
replacing country figures by better information when it exists. This is 
never done at present, and the proposal to do so is a major recommen- 
dation to the Fund. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  capital  account  counterparts to world 
current-account imbalances are much less plain in the present form of 
the Fund’s tables than are the current-account balances because of the 
accounting structure imposed on them. Capital account categories in 
the Fund’s Balance of  Payments Manual are defined mainly in terms 
of sectors-official,  banks, nonbanks-rather  than markets and cannot 
be used in international financial market analysis or even for consis- 
tency checking in statistics. The Manual’s chapters on capital account 
are a small part of the publication and are far too simplified for today’s 
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balance of payments program is surely to put attention to capital ac- 
count on a scale that the subject now deserves. Imminent SNA revi- 
sions make such a review all the more urgent. 
8.6  Relation to National Accounting Systems 
It seems appropriate, in an Income and Wealth Conference volume, 
to mention, at least, the connection and possible effect the working 
party’s report might have on national accounts around the world and 
in  total. Current accounts are, after all, part of national income and 
product accounts, and the full balance of payments statement is part 
of flow-of-funds accounting. More broadly, these changes are proposed 
in a world that is at least quadruple entry in its bookkeeping within 
one or another form of  SNA. The connection is simple in principle, 
but  it  is  also  complicated  enough  in its detail to make a thorough 
description far too tedious to work through here. 
The accounts that we are dealing with here can be laid out as a matrix 
with country balance of payments statements as columns and the Fund’s 
categories-both  current account and a reorganized or homogenized 
or summarized form of capital account-as  rows. The rows add hori- 
zontally to a final column, variously called “all countries” or “world,” 
depending on context, that carries the full collection of world imbal- 
ances that the working party has been looking into. The net vertical 
sum in this last column is world-total errors and omissions, which is 
also the horizontal sum across countries of errors and omissions. The 
structure here is exactly that of a flow-of-funds  matrix, and each column 
is in fact a flow-of-funds accounting for a country in which all domestic 
relations have been consolidated out. 
Every change proposed in the report for the current-account section 
of the matrix affects at least four cells and perhaps subtotals and group- 
ings of rows such as GNP and national saving and investment. Shifts 
of a country’s flows from one row to another within current account 
typically have little or no effect, while a statement that a country has 
the wrong number for an income flow alters a good many domestic 
figures and discrepancies as well as the imbalances in the Fund’s world 
totals. The working party proposed a set of current-account changes 
that altogether come to $50 billion of net credits affecting the GNP of 
various  countries-much  less for GDP-and  another $8  billion  for 
transfers. Capital account changes associated with these and separate 
from them have not been worked out except in the suggestions of table 
8.7, and the effects on country errors and omissions and on national 
income and product account discrepancies are also still to be calculated. 
Although the full results are not known yet, this is a useful context 
for mentioning one policy-related aspect of the working party’s exer- 
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ments analysis. Some of the adjustments in table 8.2 are for international 
organizations, and these are plainly a column in the world matrix that 
was missing from the Fund’s totals in  1985 and that  belongs there 
parallel with geographic countries. Other economic groups were also 
missing, however, including holders-or  holdings-of  at least $300 bil- 
lion of international claims and the owners-or operations-of the Greek 
merchant shipping fleet. In both cases, these amounts were not known 
to and not included by any reporting country. It is possible, as illus- 
trated  in the report, to use information from Switzerland and other 
investor havens to get the addresses on the accounts of such claims 
and to allocate international assets to the countries named in the ac- 
count addresses. Such a procedure affects the national accounts of the 
named countries accordingly, but there is an important question whether 
any knowledge is added by the practice of attributing to countries assets 
or activities that  have effectively  moved  into international markets 
separate from all conventional country connections. In such cases the 
urge to balance the accounts as presently constructed seems to have 
obscured rather than clarified matters. 
The report raises this question and suggests that the money or income 
can appropriately be identified with a country if it is somehow available 
for the country’s international financing, either through domestic in- 
vestment conditions that can attract it home or by some form of com- 
mandeering. The problem here is that, if  commandeering is any kind 
of a possibility, the expatriate money surely goes underground as tightly 
as it can to avoid being available. On the other hand, domestic con- 
ditions that are attractive enough for a reflow of national capital will 
also attract fully foreign funds, perhaps at least as well, and the meaning 
of availability then broadens to embrace an entire world financial mar- 
ket. In either condition, the meaning of a country’s funds held abroad 
is ambiguous, and the report concludes that there is a gray area here 
that calls for judgment. 
The problem here may be in attaching concepts based  on nation- 
state traditions to a world where there are many states but only poorly 
delineated nations and where in fact much economic activity is truly 
international  and without  significant national connections.  Major in- 
ternational banks seem to be in this condition, along with more mature 
multinational corporations.  Statisticians tend to insert data for these 
banks and businesses rather arbitrarily into one or another national 
total without regard for the operating relations among the parts of these 
firms or with their host countries. There is at the same time a great 
deal of individuals’ wealth that is as international as the business ac- 
tivity but much less well known and largely ignored in country statistics. 
For neither business nor individuals is the present treatment helpful 
analytically. It may be time now, when SNA structure is being recon- 
sidered, to set up such internationalized  activity in the accounts in a 426  Stephen Taylor 
more realistic form, namely, as separate columns in the world matrix 
parallel to international agencies and to geographic states. Such col- 
umns need their own balance of payments statements vis-a-vis all other 
columns, and they need GNP, GDP, and saving and investment mea- 
surements of their own. Defining the group statistically needs thought- 
ful  consideration  from several  viewpoints,  but  one starts from  the 
concept that it consists of all the money in international markets that 
conventional national statistics do not claim for one or another geo- 
graphic state. Working this out is another natural function for the staff 
of the Fund, using the statistical base they have and can develop in 
relation to table 8.8. One role such a synthetic sector group can serve 
for the Fund is to act as intermediary  between the country-reported 
statistics that the Fund much prefers to use and the alternative global 
views that are inflicted on the Fund by independent information and 
imbalances. 
Appendix A 
Terms of Reference of the Working Party on 
the Statistical Discrepancy in World Balance 
of Payments Accounts 
The Working Party will investigate the principal sources of discrepancy 
in global balance of payments statistics, consider various ways in which 
statistical practices might be amended, and make recommendations. 
It is understood that the principal focus of the group’s activities will 
be the Investment Income and Financial Services accounts, and that 
particular attention will be given to the role of the offshore centers. In 
carrying forward its work in this area the group will be assisted by a 
technical staff, of up to five professionals, that will be provided by the 
Fund and will be based in Washington. 
The Working Party may also consider other sources of discrepancy 
in balance of payments accounts, if  these appear to be of significant 
importance and amenable  to  investigation. In undertaking work in these 
areas, the Working Party may call on the assistance of the Fund staff, 
the OECD secretariat or other agencies,  within  the limits of the re- 
sources available. 
The Chairman of the Working Party will determine, in consultation 
with other members, the program of work and the timing of meetings. 
The final report of the Working Party will be presented to  the Managing 
Director no later than December 1986, and an interim report will be 
presented no later than December 1985. 427  World Payments Imbalances and U.S.  Statistics 
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Notes 
1. For the final published report, see International Monetary Fund (1987). 
2.  Some  of  the  discrepancy  in trade arises from  a  timing  float  between 
recording of shipments as exports and as imports, and the Fund’s Research 
Department  includes estimates of the float component of the discrepancy  in 
their World Economic Outlook publications (e.g., International Monetary Fund 
1986c, 70, table A30). The timing asymmetry and the residual asymmetry are 
both more volatile than the total trade balance discrepancy and are negatively 
correlated with each other, but the components are as small as the total and 
also without trend relative to the volume of  trade. Trade is not part of  the 
direct problem whether or not the timing adjustment is accurate. 
3. The BIS maintains its banking data on a quarterly basis and publishes 
them quarterly in International Banking and Financial Market Developments, 
along with a commentary (e.g., Bank for International Settlements 1986). The 
Fund incorporates BIS geographic detail into a broader coverage and somewhat 
different definition of banking, and the results appear in the Fund’s monthly 
International Financial  Statistics, in the world tables at the front as “Inter- 
national  Banking  Statistics”  (IBS). The relation  between  the two forms  of 
statistics and between them and other types of banking statistics is described 
in several publications (e.g., International Monetary Fund 1986b). The working 
party’s report includes an appendix that describes the data in detail. 
4. Comparing BIS-Fund data with national banking statistics can require a 
good deal of specific knowledge for any country on the nature of banking data 
and the structure of financial institutions. This is true even in comparing IBS 
pages with country pages within International Financial Statistics. 
5. The $33 billion total is, to be sure, a net sum of credits less debits, and 
giving proportions of  such a  net  sum, as in  the text, is not  proper.  Credit 
adjustments, however, far outweigh debits in the sum in this case. 
6. It is important to mention that offshore reporting of geographic detail for 
nonbanks was thin before December  1983 and only at that date became sub- 
stantial enough to contribute significant information to the problem. The BIS 
shows a major break in series at December 1983, one that the user should cross 
only  with  much  caution. The Fund made  a  different  choice  by  estimating 
nonbank geography back to 1981 on a basis consistent with the new series and 
showing nothing  before  1981 on nonbank  geography.  Both  treatments show 
plainly the lack of history that could put present conditions into perspective. 
7. The asset difference in table 8.4 appears to be a minimum. The IBS figure 
probably omits most amounts invested abroad by banks on behalf of  customers, 
about $34 billion at 1983 year end, and the difference could be that much larger 
than table 8.4 shows. 
8.  If  the income is  spent  abroad on consumption, we  can hope  that the 
spending is picked up in the foreign travel component of personal consumption 
already, and the revision will have the same effect as repatriated income. 429  World Payments Imbalances and U.S. Statistics 
9. The working party’s income questionnaire shows that a closer match is 
possible for many countries by bringing more capital account detail into the 
standard structure. 
10. Succeeded Mr. Kozo Tsukagoshi, Bank of Japan, in July 1985. 
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Comment  Michael P.  Dooley 
The emergence of a statistical discrepancy in the adding up property 
of  current accounts in  international payments statistics has been an 
important problem for analysis of international economic conditions. 
Analysis of economic development, exchange rate determination, and 
international debt problems all require information concerning net flows 
of  goods and services among countries and groups of  countries. As 
Mr. Taylor clearly shows, the attempts to reconcile recorded payments 
for purchases of goods and services with recorded receipts in recent 
years have consistently shown that some countries have on balance 
received  but  not  recorded receipts.  Thus, some countries’ current- 
account deficits have been smaller (or their surpluses larger) than na- 
tional statistics suggest. Moreover, these discrepancies have been so 
large that they  call into doubt even broad  analyses of  net  resource 
transfers among groups of  countries. 
Michael P.  Dooley is  chief, External Adjustment  Division,, Research  Department, 
International Monetary Fund. 430  Stephen Taylor 
The report of the task force of which Taylor was a member provides 
a very detailed report on the major sources of the statistical discrep- 
ancy. Roughly speaking, this report identifies the types of transactions 
that account for most of the discrepancy, although the report provides 
only limited geographic breakdown as to which countries’ or groups 
of countries’ current accounts were most affected. Taylor supplements 
this material by  providing educated guesses concerning the regional 
breakdowns for the unrecorded receipts. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of  the exercise is the evidence 
that financial transactions account for a substantial part of the difficulty. 
It is well known that the scale of gross capital flows among countries 
is many times greater today than it was only a few years ago. What is 
less appreciated is the fact that interest and dividend payments on such 
positions have become an important part of “service”  payments ap- 
pearing in the current account. In particular, Taylor shows that cred- 
itors seem to report income receipts that are substantially less than 
payments reported by debtors. Moreover, if the natural assumption is 
made  that  unreported  receipts in  turn  become unreported financial 
claims that in time will generate even more unreported income, we 
have the seeds of  destruction for the usability of the data on interna- 
tional transactions.  As Taylor suggests, damage could be limited by 
utilizing data for cross-border stocks appearing on the books of financial 
institutions to benchmark the investment income and capital flow data. 
The unwillingness of  investors to report  income  on their foreign 
investments may  not  be difficult to understand.  Indeed,  one of  the 
attractions of foreign financial positions may be that income is relatively 
easily concealed. Procedures set out in the task force report for ad- 
justing data for countries that are known to be creditors, perhaps on 
the basis of debtors’ data on stocks of debt or payments flows, would 
seem necessary in order to restore greater confidence in the data on 
international transactions. 